ANALISI DELLE ISTITUZIONI POLITICHE corso progredito Biennio di laurea magistrale Politica e Istituzioni Comparate Lezione 25 – Il processo legislativo della UE

Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains König, Lindberg, Lechner & Pohlmeier British Journal of Political Science, 2007, 37:

La Procedura di Codecisione UE 1. Commission initiates legislation 2. EP amends (SM) or adopts (SM) 3. Commission issues opinion on EP amendments 4. Council amends (QMV) – Common Position (CP) adopts (QMV) - LAW 4. Commission issues opinion on CP 5. EP 2nd reading (3 months) - accepts CP (abs. maj.) or fails to act - LAW - rejects CP (abs. maj.) – NO LAW - amends CP (abs. maj.) 6. Commission issues opinion on EP amendments 7. Council 2nd reading (3 months) - accepts Commission-supported EP amendments (QMV) – LAW - accepts Commission-unsupported EP amendments (Unan.) – LAW

… Council - convenes conciliation committee if EP amendments are rejected 8. Conciliation Committee (6 weeks) - equal EP & Council - approves joint EP/Council text - fails to approve text – NO LAW 9. EP and Council 3rd reading (6 weeks) Joint Text - EP (sing. maj.) & Council (QMV) votes - LAW otherwise - NO LAW Conciliation committee (al Maggio 2004) Quindici rappresentanti del CdM e del PE Membri PE: 3 vice-presidenti EP, presidente e rapporteur della parlamentare, più altri dieci scelti dai partiti

Dati sulla codecisione Maggio 1999 – Luglio Procedure Prima lettura 25% Seconda lettura 51% Conciliazione 24%

Ipotesi 1. The institutional actor closer to the SQ will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 2. The institutional actor with a more cohesive preference distribution will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 3. The institutional actor who is more patient will be more successful in the conciliation bargains

Ipotesi (cont) 4. When the Council presidency is held by a country with an outlier voting pattern, the Council will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 5. If the rapporteur of the parliamentary delegation to the conciliation committee is not a member of either EPP or PES, the Parliament will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 6. The institutional actor with a more similar preference to the Commission will be more successful in the conciliation bargains

Dati e operazionalizzazione Unità di analisi: 75 negoziazioni (casi di conflitto) tra Consiglio e Parlamento nel conciliation committee dal Maggio 1999 al Luglio 2002 Variabile dipendente -1 vittoria CdM 0 pareggio 1 vittoria PE Variabili indipendenti Distanza dallo SQ del CdM e PE (-1, 0, 1) Coesione del PE (0-100) Coesione del CdM (0-100) Impazienza (tasso di sconto ) del CdM (0-100) Impazienza (tasso di sconto ) del PE (0-100) Presidenza outlier del CdM (0, 1) Rapporteur del EPP o PSE (0, 1) Posizione della Commissione (-100 CdM, 100 PE) Controllo: Dimensionalità (0,1), Trend temporale

Risultati 1. The institutional actor closer to the SQ will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 2. The institutional actor with a more cohesive preference distribution will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 3. The institutional actor who is more patient will be more successful in the conciliation bargains confermata non confermata

Risultati (cont) 4. When the Council presidency is held by a country with an outlier voting pattern, the Council will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 5. If the rapporteur of the parliamentary delegation to the conciliation committee is not a member of either EPP or PES, the Parliament will be more successful in the conciliation bargains 6. The institutional actor with a more similar preference to the Commission will be more successful in the conciliation bargains non confermata confermata

Risultati (cont) Il Parlamento Europeo vince la maggior parte delle negoziazioni nel conciliation committee Ma il Consiglio ha maggior successo in caso di dispute multi-dimensionali(più complesse) Gli stati membri beneficiano maggiormente dalla mancanza di coesione del Parlamento (che viceversa) La probabilità di vittoria del Consiglio è influenzata significativamente dallappoggio della Commissione