Ius cogens.

Presentazione sul tema: "Ius cogens."— Transcript della presentazione:

1 Ius cogens

2 Art. 53 Convenzione di Vienna 1969
Articolo 53 Trattati in conflitto con una norma imperativa del diritto internazionale generale (ius cogens) E’ nullo qualsiasi trattato che, al momento della sua conclusione, è in conflitto con una norma imperativa del diritto internazionale generale.

3 Art. 53 Ai fini della presente Convenzione, una norma imperativa del diritto internazionale generale è una norma accettata e riconosciuta dalla comunità internazionale degli Stati nel suo complesso come norma alla quale non è consentita alcuna deroga e che può essere modificata soltanto da un'altra norma del diritto internazionale generale avente lo stesso carattere.

4 Risoluzione Assemblea Generale 34/65 B del 29 novembre 1979
Question of Palestine Accordi di pace di Camp David tra Israele, Egitto e USA

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8 Obblighi erga omnes CIG caso Barcelona Traction (1970), par. 33: ….In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

9 Segue… Par. 34: Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

10 Risoluzione IDI Cracovia 2005
Definizione di obblighi erga omnes: an obligation under general international law that a State owes in any given case to the international community, in view of its common values and its concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to take action; or an obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the treaty owes in any given case to all the other States parties to the same treaty, in view of their common values and concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all these States to take action.

11 Congo c. Ruanda 2006, par. 64 (decisione sulla giurisdizione)
The Court will begin by reaffirming that “the principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation” and that a consequence of that conception is “the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co- operation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the Convention)” (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23).

12 Segue… The mere fact that rights and obligations erga omnes may be at issue in a dispute would not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. The same applies to the relationship between peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction : the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm having such a character, which is assuredly the case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute.

13 CEDU-caso Al Adsani c. Regno Unito (2001)
61. While the Court accepts, on the basis of these authorities, that the prohibition of torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm in international law (…) … Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in international law, the Court is unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged.

14 Corte di Cassazione, sezioni unite n. 5044/04, 11. 03
Corte di Cassazione, sezioni unite n. 5044/04, (caso Ferrini) È ricorrente l’affermazione che i crimini internazionali «minacciano l’umanità intera e minano le fondamenta stesse della coesistenza internazionale…. Si tratta, infatti, di delitti che si concretano nella violazione, particolarmente grave per intensità o sistematicità (arg. ex articolo 40, secondo comma, del Progetto sulla responsabilità internazionale degli Stati, adottato nell’agosto del 2001 dalla Commissione di diritto internazionale dell’ONU), dei diritti fondamentali della persona umana, la cui tutela è affidata a norme inderogabili che si collocano al vertice dell’ordinamento internazionale, prevalendo su ogni altra norma, sia di carattere convenzionale che consuetudinario (Tribunale penale per la ex Jugoslavia, 10 dicembre 1998, Furunduzija, ; 14 gennaio 2000, Kupreskic, 520; Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, 21 novembre 2001, Al-Adsani c. Regno Unito, 61) e, quindi, anche su quelle in tema di immunità.

15 …segue Il riconoscimento dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione in favore degli Stati che si siano resi responsabili di tali misfatti si pone in palese contrasto con i dati normativi appena ricordati, poiché detto riconoscimento, lungi dal favorire, ostacola la tutela di valori, la cui protezione è da considerare invece, alla stregua di tali norme e principi, essenziale per l’intera Comunità internazionale, tanto da giustificare, nelle ipotesi più gravi, anche forme di reazione obbligatorie. E non può esservi dubbio che l’antinomia debba essere risolta dando prevalenza alle norme di rango più elevato, come puntualizzato nelle opinioni dissidenti espresse dai giudici di minoranza (otto contro nove) allegate alla sentenza Al-Adsani (retro, § 9): quindi, escludendo che, in ipotesi siffatte, lo Stato possa giovarsi dell’immunità della giurisdizione straniera.

16 ICJ - Caso Germania c. Italia (argomento dell’Italia)
92. The Court now turns to the second strand in Italy’s argument, which emphasizes the jus cogens status of the rules which were violated by Germany during the period 1943‑1945. This strand of the argument rests on the premise that there is a conflict between jus cogens rules forming part of the law of armed conflict and according immunity to Germany. Since jus cogens rules always prevail over any inconsistent rule of international law, whether contained in a treaty or in customary international law, so the argument runs, and since the rule which accords one State immunity before the courts of another does not have the status of jus cogens, the rule of immunity must give way.

17 ICJ - Germania c. Italia risposta della Corte
93. This argument therefore depends upon the existence of a conflict between a rule, or rules, of jus cogens, and the rule of customary law which requires one State to accord immunity to another. In the opinion of the Court, however, no such conflict exists. Assuming for this purpose that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibit the murder of civilians in occupied territory, the deportation of civilian inhabitants to slave labour and the deportation of prisoners of war to slave labour are rules of jus cogens, there is no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity.

18 …Segue The two sets of rules address different matters. The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful.