The Court of Justice of the European Communities: a melting pot of legal cultures Judith Turnbull Seminario permanente Lionello R. Levi Sandri 12-13 novembre.

Presentazione sul tema: "The Court of Justice of the European Communities: a melting pot of legal cultures Judith Turnbull Seminario permanente Lionello R. Levi Sandri 12-13 novembre."— Transcript della presentazione:

1 The Court of Justice of the European Communities: a melting pot of legal cultures Judith Turnbull Seminario permanente Lionello R. Levi Sandri 12-13 novembre 2009

2 Court of Justice of the European Communities 27 Judges 8 Advocates General Judges and Advocates General are appointed from all Member States

3 Advocates General sit independently assist judges in Court attend the preliminary meeting and hearing present an Opinion to the Court before the panel of judges deliberates Opinion is purely advisory

4 Corpus 40 Opinions of Advocates General 1998-2008 (20 British + 20 Italian ) Only two British Advocates General Four Italian Advocates General Total number of words: 310,162 (Br. 129,625; It. 180,537) Opinions range in length from 2500 to 21000 words

5 Role of judges in the English and Italian legal systems Common law system Judges interpret and can create the law (precedents and judge-made law) Civil law system Judges act as officials of the law and apply it as written in the codes

6 Style of English and Italian judgments English judgments are described as conversational, combative or rhetorical (Lord Hope of Craighead 2005) Italian judgments are conceived and written as bureaucratic documents. […]it is a document which is not written by a judge, but by the body of the law and the motivazione is not an apology of the judge that has reached a decision, but the formal explanation of an impersonal decision. (Taruffo1988).

7 Morpho-syntactic and lexical characteristics of English judgments Morpho-syntactic characteristics: relatively simple sentence structure (if long, parenthetically connected) very frequent use of hypothetical propositions to represent the reasoning of the judge extensive use of pronouns and personal adjectives (especially 1st person) use of certain rhetorical forms, as for example, direct questions, direct speech, recapitulation Lexical characteristics frequent use of modality expressions (modal verbs, adverbs and adverbial phrases) use of emotionally intensive lexis (Scarpa and Riley 2000)

8 Morpho-syntactic and lexical characteristics of Italian judgments Morpho-syntactic characteristics adjective or past participle positioned before the noun (in concreto incidente, per il dichiarato intento) simple prepositions instead of articulated prepositions (oltre a rivalutazione) frequent use of the passive, often together with the gerund (non potendosi desumere, non essendo stato il documento confermato) hypotaxis, long and complex sentences, with frequent use of embedded phrases, especially to define terms systematic inversion of subject-verb into verb-subject (ritiene il collegio diversificare) object is placed before the verb (a soggetto che tale attività svolge) leftward movement of parts of speech (adverbs, numbers, agents, past participle in initial position) use of imperfect with a narrative function (to describe the proceedings) use of present participle use of clitics Lexical characteristics : use of Latin expressions formulaic language use of rare words and archaisms redundant stereotypical phrases (Scarpa and Riley 2000; Rega 1997)

9 Table 1: Personal pronouns and adjectives 1st person singularBritishItalian I337375 My103125 Me84156 1st person plural We125 Our220 Us426 Table 1: Number of occurrences of 1st person sing. and pl. verb forms, pronouns and adjectives

10 Table 2: Most frequently occurring verbs in the 1st person: the first 15 of the 70 verbs in the British corpus and of the 50 verbs in the Italian corpus BritishItalian consider42ritengo121 am (of the view/persuaded)34ricordo 36 agree32osservo 29 conclude15propongo 29 think12credo 26 feel10dico 18 see 9rilevo 12 refer 9suggerisco 9 add 9concludo 8 note 8convengo 8 explain 7passo 8 accept 5aggiungo 7 set out 5ripeto 6 propose 4premetto 4 understand 4vedo 4

11 Table 3: Expressions with 1st person possessive adjectives my and mi/o/a/ei/e BritishItalian (in my) view (to my) mind analysis conclusion example part understanding concern forty years interpretation knowledge reading remarks rendering translation 66 10 2 1 a mio avviso corsivo parere (da/per) parte giudizio modo di vedere conclusioni convinzione intenzione perplessità 70 25 9 4 3 2 1

12 Structure of English and Italian judgments English Italian Communicative function Facts Proceedingsdescriptive Issues ReasoningMotivazioneexplanatory ConclusionDispositivodecisional

13 Structure of Opinions Question. Relevant legislation (community and national) Facts and procedure Assessment Conclusions Introduzione. Quadro normativo Fatti, questioni pregiudiziali Analisi giuridica Conclusioni

14 Complexity of Opinions Example of English Opinion Origins of case Community law-Parent/subsidiary Directive Relevant Belgian law Implementation of Parent/Subsidiary Directive Usufruct in Belgian law Facts and the question referred Admissibility Insufficient information Absence of Community element Substance Must the directive apply to a right of usufruct? The aim of the directive The scheme of the directive The wording of the directive May the Directive apply to a right of usufruct? Conclusion (C-48/07) Example of Italian Opinion Introduzione Contesto normativo Causa principale e questioni pregiudiziali Sulle questioni pregiudiziali A. Osservazioni preliminari B. Sulle prime 4 questioni relative allinter- pretazione della NC (nomenclatura combinata) -Considerazioni introduttive -Argomenti delle parti -Valutazioni a) osservazioni generali b) Sulla nota 5 del capitolo84 della NC (i)…, (ii)…, (iii)…. c) Sulla nota 3 della Sezione XVI d) Sulla regola n. 3 (i)…, (ii)…, e) Conclusioni parziali C. Sulla validità del regolamento n. 400/2006 -Argomenti delle parti -Valutazione Conclusioni (C-362/07)

15 Personal 58. I am not, however, persuaded by either of the above arguments that my understanding of the Directive is misconceived. It is settled case-law that Community legislation must be interpreted not solely on the basis of its wording, but also in the light of the overall scheme and objectives of the system of which it is a part. (38) I have explained above what I consider to be the scheme and objectives of the Directive and why my interpretation of its provisions is consistent therewith. The concepts of a holding … in the capital of a company and a parent companys association with its subsidiary must be understood in that context, which is – again – not primarily a company law context. (C-48/07)

16 Evaluative (and personal) language In so saying, the national court made two correct statements and one significant error. The Community arrangements for market support in the agricultural sector do indeed all depend, correctly, upon making sure that those claiming support comply with the necessary conditions laid down by the Community regulations. The wine and grape producers were indeed the intended ultimate recipients of the aid. However, it seems to me that, on a proper construction of Regulation No 2499/82, the distillers (DAI) were not, in any true sense, the intended recipients of the aid in so far as concerns the minimum buying-in price. Rather, they were the conduit through which that aid was intended – provided that the wine duly entered the distillery and was distilled – to be transmitted to the wine producers.(C-51/05 P)

17 Bureaucratic 82. Più in generale, emerge dalla giurisprudenza che la sussistenza del requisito di selettività deve fare loggetto di una valutazione caso per caso, mirata a verificare se la misura di cui trattasi, conto tenuto della sua natura, del suo ambito di applicazione, delle sue modalità di attuazione e dei suoi effetti, comporti o no vantaggi a esclusivo profitto di talune imprese o di taluni settori di attività (38). Ove sia accertata la sussistenza di un siffatto vantaggio, anche la non imposizione di un nuovo tributo a determinati operatori economici può costituire un aiuto ai sensi dellart. 87, n. 1, CE (39). (C 487/06)

18 34. La cittadinanza irlandese di Catherine, dunque, è elemento sufficiente a escludere che la controversia che la oppone, assieme alla madre, al Secretary of State sia puramente interna allordinamento britannico. 35. Ad una conclusione diversa si potrebbe eventualmente pervenire solo ove si ritenesse che Catherine non possieda effettivamente la cittadinanza irlandese, o che comunque il possesso di quella cittadinanza non sia opponibile al governo del Regno Unito. 36. Devo tuttavia notare che in nessuna fase della procedura, né di fronte al giudice nazionale né di fronte alla Corte, è mai stato messo in dubbio che la piccola Catherine possegga effettivamente la cittadinanza irlandese, come del resto non è stata contestata dal governo del Regno Unito la legittimità, dal punto di vista del diritto internazionale o comunitario, dellattribuzione di quella cittadinanza da parte dello Stato irlandese. 37. Così stando le cose, non è necessario prendere posizione sullesistenza o meno di una norma di diritto internazionale generale secondo cui nessuno Stato sarebbe tenuto a riconoscere la cittadinanza attribuita ad un singolo da un altro Stato, in assenza di un legame reale ed effettivo dellindividuo con lo Stato nazionale (8). (C-200/02) Natural

19 37. This aspect has not been discussed before the Court in great detail, and it would not be appropriate to express a definitive view which should be based on a full appreciation of national circumstances. However, the contested amendment appears to mean that the rule precluding reimbursement where the burden of the tax has been passed on applies to all categories of claimant but one: those who have brought proceedings before the Verfassungsgerichtshof challenging a tax declared unconstitutional by that court. 38. If it is the case that entitlement to benefit from Anlaßfallwirkung is confined to those bringing challenges under national constitutional law, then the rules governing reimbursement of taxes found incompatible with national law might be more favourable, in that regard, than in the case of taxes found incompatible with Community law. 39. For the amendment to comply with the principle of equivalence, it would be necessary either for the benefit of the exception to be extended to all those who have challenged a tax found to be incompatible with Community law or for the exception to be abolished entirely.(C-147/01) Impersonal

20 Signposting A mio avviso, la misura adottata dall'amministrazione danese offende le disposizioni del Trattato in materia di libero stabilimento. Come meglio spiegherò, essa non restringe semplicemente l'esercizio del diritto di stabilimento secondario riconosciuto alle società straniere comunitarie, ma lo preclude radicalmente. (C-212/97 )

21 31. Credo però che lobiezione non possa essere accolta. 32. Ricordo anzitutto che, secondo la costante giurisprudenza comunitaria, il possesso della cittadinanza di uno Stato membro diverso da quello in cui una persona risiede è elemento sufficiente a determinare lapplicazione delle disposizioni del diritto comunitario, anche quando la persona che invoca quelle disposizioni non abbia mai varcato le frontiere dello Stato membro in cui risiede (5). 33. In particolare, nella recente sentenza Garcia Avello, dopo aver ricordato che «[l]a cittadinanza dellUnione, sancita dallart. 17 CE, non ha (…) lo scopo di ampliare la sfera di applicazione ratione materiae del Trattato a situazioni nazionali che non abbiano alcun collegamento con il diritto comunitario» (6), la Corte ha avuto modo di chiarire che [….] 34. La cittadinanza irlandese di Catherine, dunque, è elemento sufficiente a escludere che la controversia che la oppone, assieme alla madre, al Secretary of State sia puramente interna allordinamento britannico. 35. Ad una conclusione diversa si potrebbe eventualmente pervenire solo ove si ritenesse che Catherine non possieda effettivamente la cittadinanza irlandese, o che comunque il possesso di quella cittadinanza non sia opponibile al governo del Regno Unito. 36. Devo tuttavia notare che in nessuna fase della procedura, né di fronte al giudice nazionale né di fronte alla Corte, è mai stato messo in dubbio che la piccola Catherine possegga effettivamente la cittadinanza irlandese, come del resto non è stata contestata dal governo del Regno Unito la legittimità, dal punto di vista del diritto internazionale o comunitario, dellattribuzione di quella cittadinanza da parte dello Stato irlandese. 37. Così stando le cose, non è necessario prendere posizione sullesistenza o meno di una norma di diritto internazionale generale secondo cui nessuno Stato sarebbe tenuto a riconoscere la cittadinanza attribuita ad un singolo da un altro Stato, in assenza di un legame reale ed effettivo dellindividuo con lo Stato nazionale (8). 38. Mi limito a ricordare che, per quanto attiene allordinamento comunitario, la Corte ha affermato nelle sentenze Micheletti (9) e Kaur (10) che «la determinazione dei modi di acquisto e di perdita della cittadinanza rientra, in conformità al diritto internazionale, nella competenza di ciascuno Stato membro» (11), e che pertanto «[n]on spetta (…) alla legislazione di uno Stato membro limitare gli effetti dellattribuzione della cittadinanza di un altro Stato membro, pretendendo un requisito ulteriore per il riconoscimento di tale cittadinanza al fine dellesercizio delle libertà fondamentali previste dal Trattato» (12). 39. Mi sembra pertanto di poter concludere che, in considerazione della cittadinanza irlandese della piccola Catherine, la controversia pendente davanti allImmigration Authority rientra in linea di principio nellambito di applicazione del Trattato e che leccezione di irricevibilità sollevata dal governo del Regno Unito deve quindi essere respinta. (C-200/02) Signposting 2

22 Hypothesising 87. …. As a result, this Court was not given the opportunity, at that stage, of examining the structure and purpose of Regulation No 2499/82. Had it done so, it seems to me likely that it would have reached the same conclusion as has the Court of First Instance, namely that there was a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82 leading to different treatment of wine producers depending upon whether their Member State had chosen the Article 9 or the Article 10 procedure; that the difference in treatment was not justified; and that responsibility for that violation lay with the Community institution that had drafted Regulation No 2499/82, i.e. the Commission. (45) Although the answers given to the national court would (inevitably) have led to the applicants failing to recover the Community aid due to them through their intervention in the national proceedings, they would then objectively have known that the claim lay against the Commission. Time would clearly, therefore, have run against them from that point for the purposes of bringing an action for compensation under Article 235 EC. 88. It is possible that the national court paid less than full attention to the wine producers interests because they were interveners in DAIs action, rather than applicants in their own name. It seems to me that it would be rather harsh to fault the producers, in the circumstances, for not bringing separate proceedings, presumably against DAI (since it was the distiller who actually owed them the balance of the Community aid payable) with AIMA and perhaps Assedile as additional defendants. As it was, there was already a relevant action (between DAI and AIMA) that was live before the national courts. It would have seemed rather natural, in the interests of procedural efficiency and economy, to intervene in that action and to place the wine producers entitlement to payment of their Community aid before the national court in that way. Had DAI succeeded, or lost following a reference, they would (respectively) have either had a better chance of being paid the aid by DAI or at least known where they stood. If it was an error to intervene in those proceedings rather than to commence separate proceedings, it seems to me that that error was objectively excusable. (C-51/05)

23 Hypothesising 2 96. It seems to me that those two limbs could equally well have been phrased (and might perhaps have been more felicitously phrased) in terms of what a reasonable bystander, observing the situation, would have supposed the objective situation to be. Objectively, looking at the Community legislation, the quasi-contractual relations between AIMA and the wine producers, the fact that the wine producers had complied with their obligations and the apparent purpose of the Community legislation as expressed in the recitals to Regulation No 2499/82, it seems to me that such a bystander would have supposed that the proper course of redress was by way of proceedings before the national court to obtain payment of the Community aid with, in all probability, a reference under Article 234 EC. […] I find it difficult to accept the idea that a reasonable bystander, viewing the situation objectively, would have jumped to the conclusion in 1983 that the wine producers should launch a damages claim against the Commission. 97. […] I consider that such a bystander would have said that, although the general nature of the damage that the applicants were likely to suffer if they were not paid the Community aid might be obvious in June 1983, its unavoidable nature was not… (C-51/05)

24 Conclusions ? Italian Opinions extensive use of personalized forms less variation in expression, hence more formulaic British Opinions fairly frequent use of impersonal discourse writers position is not always explicit

25 Two Anecdotes L'inadempienza imputata all'Irlanda, se la Corte ritiene di doverla dichiarare per le ragioni da me proposte, non comporta necessariamente, ripeto, che le soglie oggetto di censura debbano essere necessariamente abbassate ad altro livello e la Commissione non ha d'altronde precisato a quale altro livello come se quella fosse la sola via per passare, al pari di Alice nel paese delle meraviglie, attraverso un magico uscio. ( C-392/96) It was characterised by simplicity of structure and economy of language that is typical of the judgments issued by the ECJ: The style was distinctive precisely because it was so disciplined... (Lord Hope of Craighead 2005: 1)