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Tassazione internazionale delle società - PARTE I Clamep Tassazione e mercati finanziari Clasda 4 crediti – 30 ore 1.10.2008-3.11.2008 LEZIONE 2 Aliquote.

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Presentazione sul tema: "Tassazione internazionale delle società - PARTE I Clamep Tassazione e mercati finanziari Clasda 4 crediti – 30 ore 1.10.2008-3.11.2008 LEZIONE 2 Aliquote."— Transcript della presentazione:

1 Tassazione internazionale delle società - PARTE I Clamep Tassazione e mercati finanziari Clasda 4 crediti – 30 ore LEZIONE 2 Aliquote effettive

2 2 MicroMacro Backward- looking Imposte/utili da singoli bilanci di impresa o dichiarazioni Gettito delle imposte sulle società/ proxi macro della base imponibile (Aliquote implicite) Gettito dellimposta societaria /Pil e /T Forward- looking Aliquote marginali effettive (METR) Aliquote medie effettive (AETR)

3 3 Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (1) When policy makers or economic agents want to evaluate the impact of taxation on economic activity and understand the usefulness and likely effects of their decisions, they need to assess effective tax burdens. They therefore need to take into account the interplay of the statutory rates, the provisions defining the tax base and the subsequent reduction in tax debt made possible through the existence of tax credits. In assessing effective corporate tax burdens, two types of framework can be distinguished. One approach measures effective tax rates on the basis of current data arising from aggregate macroeconomic accounts or from the accounts of existing firms. Because it is based on the observation of ex-post data, it is known as a backward-looking – macro or micro – approach. Effective tax rates based on macro backward-looking methodologies are often referred to as implicit tax rates. The second framework is based on ex-ante indicators involving the calculation of effective tax burdens, for a hypothetical prospective investment project or company, over the assumed life of the project. As they are based on future hypothetical behaviour, these indicators are defined as forward-looking.

4 4 Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (2) The existence of different indicators is not, per se, a shortcoming of this kind of analysis, but simply reflects the fact that each indicator measures different things. Different indicators can be appropriate for different policy issues (see OECD 2001). Therefore, it is worth emphasising that it is impossible to compute the universally valid effective tax rate. Moreover, this measure not only depends on the chosen approach, but also on the particular way the approach is applied. When policy makers are concerned with the effects of the increasing mobility of capital in terms of a gradual shifting of the tax burden from capital to labour or consumption, or when they are interested in knowing the actual tax burden on small versus large firms or the tax burden on different industries or types of economic activity located in their country, compared with others and over time, then the use of backward-looking indicators may be a useful policy tool. Generally,this approach is useful for addressing issues related to the distribution of the tax burden and the effects of tax legislation and possible changes of the tax code on corporate cash flow. It also permits better understanding of the sensitivity of tax revenues to the economic cycle.

5 5 Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (3) While backward-looking indicators may give an accurate picture of the tax position of a particular company, they cannot single out the incentives generated by a particular tax regime for a number of reasons. In particular, tax payments in any period may depend appreciably on the past history of the company and hence may vary between companies that are currently identical in all other respects. When the analysis of the impact of taxation on investment behaviour is the objective, and therefore the effects of tax legislation on future choices have to be pinpointed, then forward-looking indicators are preferable by far. They make it possible to isolate the structure of the incentives and disincentives offered by the elements of the tax systems for specific investments, and to take into account the interrelations of the different tax systems. Therefore, they allow a comparison of international tax regimes and identification of the most important tax drivers influencing effective tax rates. (Giannini, Maggiulli, 2002)

6 6 Backward- and Forward-Looking Approaches to Computing Effective Tax Rates (4) Forward-looking measures of effective tax rates seek to illustrate the effect of the tax code on the current incentive to invest. However, these measures may not fully capture all of the special provisions of the tax code which affect the incentives to invest in particular sectors or assets. Some studies have therefore focused on backward-looking measures of effective tax rates based on actual revenues collected. The actual taxes paid in any given year will be a function of past decisions over investment, the profitability of those investments, loss carry forward and a range of other factors. Thus it is not clear that backward-looking measures of effective tax rates are very meaningful for evaluating the effects of changes in tax rules on investment incentives, although they do of course provide information on the ability of governments to collect revenue from capital income taxes (Griffith, Hines e Sorensen, 2008…. ).

7 7 Indicatori forward looking ALIQUOTE => rendimento lordo – rendimento netto su un progetto di investimento (in %) EFFETTIVE => tengono conto dei criteri di determinazione dellimponibile (es. deducibilità ammortamenti, interessi,..) e imposta (es. crediti) MARGINALI => se riferite ad un investimento che copre appena i costi (rendimento lordo = costo del capitale) MEDIE => se riferite ad un investimento che genera extra-profitti (rendimenti lordi maggiori del costo del capitale)

8 8 Relazione (usuale) fra aliquote effettive, marginali e medie, e aliquota legale Aliquota legale Aliquota marginale Effettiva (una) Aliquote medie effettive (ciascuna in corrispondenza di un diverso livello di extra- profitto) Extra-profitti 0

9 9 I due indicatori forniscono informazioni diverse e complementari Aliquote effettive marginali di imposta (METR) Quanto investire Che beni capitali Che fonte finanziaria Aliquote effettive medie di imposta (AETR) Dove investire

10 10 Un semplice esempio per calcolare METR (1) Profitto (contabile): = R-C-AM-IP R=ricavi =F(K,L) C= costi di esercizio (per beni intermedi e del lavoro)= 0, per ipotesi AM= ammortamenti = K ( vero ammortamento economico) IP = interessi passivi= rK = F(K,L)- K-rK Ipotesi finanziamento con debito

11 11 Un semplice esempio per calcolare METR (2) Profitto economico (extra-profitto): = R-C-AM-rK K = B(debito) + E (capitale proprio) rK = costo del finanziamento: costo effettivo (contabile, IP) se finanziamento con debito costo opportunità, se finanziamento con capitale proprio

12 12 Scelte di investimento in assenza di tassazione = F(K,L)- K-rK Max (derivata prima =0) F K = + r Impresa investe fino al punto in cui F K = UCK (user cost of capital per un investimento di valore unitario) F K = UCK = + r Limpresa investe fino al punto cui il valore della produttività marginale del capitale uguaglia il costo duso del capitale (ammortamento e costo finanziario)

13 13 Scelte di investimento in assenza di tassazione: METR F K - = p = r METR = (p-r)/p =0 Non vi è alcun cuneo di imposta fra rendimenti lordi e netti sullinvestimento marginale.

14 14 Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione (1) N = F(K,L)- K-rK –T T= (F(K,L)- rK) Si deduce il costo finanziario per una percentuale N = F(K,L)- K-rK- (F(K,L)- rK) Max N ( derivata prima =0 ) F K (1- ) = + r (1- )

15 15 Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione (2) NB: Per semplicità non ho tenuto conto, nella definizione di base imponibile, della deducibilità per ammortamenti. Ne tengo conto considerando che il valore attuale del risparmio di imposta dovuto alle deducibilità delle quote di ammortamento è come una riduzione del costo effettivo dellinvestimento. Per un investimento di valore unitario il costo effettivo sarà dunque (1- A) che è 0. A esprime il valore attuale delle quote di ammortamento

16 16 Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione (3) Abbiamo dunque

17 17 Scelte di investimento in presenza di tassazione: due casi speciali Calcolate p e METR nelle seguenti due ipotesi alternative: 1.A=1; =0 ossia ammortamento immediato e indeducibilità del costo finanziario (Cash Flow Tax, CFT) 2.a= =1 ossia ammortamento fiscale = ammortamento economico e deducibilità del costo finanziario (Profit tax, PrT) Esempio numerico con: a= r

18 18 Imposte neutrali e distorsive: esempi Sulla base della seguente espressione Calcolate il cuneo di imposta p-r e lEMTR = (p-r)/p aggiungendo alle ipotesi precedenti: r Le seguenti ipotesi alternative: a= 20% (a> a= 5% (a<

19 19

20 20

21 21 Imposte neutrali e imposte distorsive (1) Limposta societaria può essere congegnata in modo da non produrre alcun cuneo tra rendimenti lordi e netti sullinvestimento, in modo cioè da essere neutrale rispetto alle decisioni di investimento (Cuneo e METR=0). Sia PrT che CFT nelle loro forme pure consentono questo risultato: La PrT perché deduce il costo finanziario del capitale e il vero ammortamento economico La CFT perché consente la deducibilità immediata delle spese di investimento (lo stato diventa un partner dellimpresa e così come concorre ai costi dellinvestimento, nella stessa percentuale, determinata dallaliquota di imposta, beneficia del rendimento) Vi sono altri schemi neutrali … Solitamente i sistemi concretamente adottati si differenziano da questi schemi neutrali e distorcono (disincentivano o incentivano) le scelte di impresa.

22 22 Imposte neutrali e imposte distorsive (2) Se il costo del finanziamento è deducibile (come è il caso usualmente degli interessi passivi) e: lammortamento a fini fiscali è uguale al vero ammortamento economico, il sistema è neutrale lammortamento fiscale supera il vero ammortamento economico (es. ammortamenti anticipati), vi è di fatto un incentivo agli investimenti (cuneo di imposta negativo) lammortamento fiscale è inferiore a quello economico il cuneo di imposta è positivo Se il costo del finanziamento non è deducibile (come è solitamente il caso se il finanziamento è con capitale proprio) si ha neutralità solo se si consente limmediata deducibilità dellinvestimento (ammortamento istantaneo). in caso contrario (non piena deducibilità degli investimenti) si ha cuneo di imposta positivo.

23 23 METR in pratica (OECD, 2007) This section presents the evolution of marginal effective tax rates over time. The traditional method of measuring the impact of corporate income tax on the level of capital investment is through the user cost of capital – defined as the pre-tax real required rate of return on an investment project, taking into account the financial cost of the investment as well as depreciation (Hall and Jorgenson [1967], King [1977], King and Fullerton [1984]). The basic idea is that a firm will invest up to the point at which the marginal product of capital is just equal to the cost of capital – so that, at the margin, the project just breaks even. As investment increases, the marginal product is assumed to decline, resulting in a unique profit-maximising level of investment. The impact of taxation on the cost of capital is measured by the marginal effective tax rate (METR). A higher marginal effective tax rate increases the cost of capital, and therefore reduces the stock of capital…..

24 24 METR in pratica (OECD, 2007) …The marginal effective tax rates are measured by considering the impact of the corporate tax system on a hypothetical investment project. The form of the investment modelled is, of necessity, simple and limited. In common with other such measures, risk is ignored. The underlying method assumes a mature manufacturing firm. The marginal effective tax rates presented here also apply only to an investment in plant and machinery,financed by equity; estimates for investment in other assets and for other sources of finance are not presented. The tax treatment of losses or other forms of tax exhaustion is not considered. The taxes that are levied on shareholders and taxes paid by corporations that are not based on profit are not included. The underlying method does not include any industry-specific measures and does not allow for any form of tax avoidance. Despite all of these limitations, the measures do provide a summary of the combined effect of the tax rate and tax base, at least on a specific form of investment.

25 25 METR: dal semplice modello alla applicazione pratica Il modello può essere reso più aderente alla realtà, tenendo conto di: Imposte personali (dipende dallo scopo analisi) Inflazione (se ne tiene sempre conto) Perdite, elusione etc… (più difficili da incorporare; vi sono studi) Hp finanziamento molto importante (debt e equity trattamento fiscale solitamente molto diverso) La misura ( METR) varia al varare del tipo di bene capitale (diverso a e diverso Vi sono diversi studi e applicazioni (che includono anche altri indicatori oltre a EMTR): Commissione UE (2001): 5 beni capitali e tre fonti di finanziamento Eurostat…, Structures… (questo e altri indicatori).

26 26

27 27 Figure 1.8 shows that, given a fixed inflation rate of 3.5 per cent, the unweighted average of the marginal effective tax rates has remained fairly stable until 1988 and between 1993 and The unweighted average dropped substantially between 1989 and 1993 and between 1997 and It has remained fairly constant since then. (OECD; 2007) A larger and more pronounced reduction in the unweighted average of the marginal effective tax rates can be observed if the actual inflation rates in each country and year are used. This result reflects the fact that with a lower inflation rate, a given tax depreciation allowance is more generous, leading to a lower marginal effective tax rate. Since 2002, this decrease has stopped. The average remains relatively constant since 2001 at an average of 18.5 per cent. This reduction in marginal effective tax rates over time then shows that the reductions in the statutory corporate tax rates have had a stronger impact on the marginal corporate tax burden than the base broadening measures that have been undertaken as well. (OECD,2007)

28 28 Aliquota media effettiva (AETR) Corporate tax systems also have an influence on the discrete choices made by, for instance, multinational firms, which face a choice between alternative locations of production. For example, if an American firm wants to enter the European market, it could locate production in one of a number of different European countries. Given the structure of its costs, it will probably not locate in all countries. The firm might choose that location (or locations) offering the highest post-tax profit. The impact of tax on this decision can be measured by the extent to which the pre-tax profit is reduced by taxation – this is measured by an average effective tax rate (AETR). Conditional on this location choice, the scale of the investment will be determined by the cost of capital and the METR. (OECD, 2007)

29 29 Ancora sulla AETR … multinational companies usually face a choice between two or more exclusive projects (exporting or producing abroad, and in the latter case, the country of investment) expected to earn more than the minimum required rate of return. To take the decision, they will compare the expected post-tax economic rents of each alternative. Hence, they will be interested in seeing how large a share of the pre-tax value of a profitable investment project will be paid as corporate income tax. A measure of this share is an effective average tax rate, since it expresses the expected total tax burden in relation to total profits.. (Giannini, Maggiulli, Cesifo economic studies, 2002 ).

30 30 … sulla relazione fra METR e AETR (1) … both effective marginal and average tax rates are important but they serve different purposes: the latter may be more appropriate for identifying the effect of taxation on the choice of location, while the former impact on the choice of how much to invest, once the choice of location has been made. ………………. The Commission services study [2001] presents effective marginal and average tax rates for a large number of different hypothetical investment projects. It is the first comprehensive analysis of effective average tax rates ever undertaken for the EC countries, which represents its most important innovation with respect to previous studies, including the Ruding Report. ( Giannini, Maggiulli, Cesifo economic studies, 2002 ).

31 31 … sulla relazione fra METR e AETR (2) …. To compute the effective average tax rate the Commission study mainly relies on the methodology developed by Devereux and Griffith (D&G 1998). This approach, which can be considered an extension of the K&F methodology, has the advantage of allowing the computation of both effective marginal and average tax rates within a single framework. In practice, the D&G model computes what we may simply call an effective tax rate for alternative hypothetical investment projects with different rates of profitability, illustrating respectively: a)the effective marginal tax rate, if the real pre-tax return is the minimum rate required to undertake the investment, that is to say, is equal to the cost of capital; b) the whole range of effective average tax rates, if the project is not marginal, i.e. if it generates economic rents. The effective tax rate (ETR) is measured as the ratio between the present value of taxes and the present value of pre-tax income a company expects to earn from alternative new investment projects that can be either marginal (effective marginal tax rate) or infra-marginal (effective average tax rate) in their posttax return.

32 32 Methodology to compute AETR The D&G analytical framework is fairly simple as it is based on a one- period perturbation of the capital stock: a hypothetical investment undertaken in period t, and providing a real return equal to p, is reversed in period t + 1. The financial policy of the company strictly follows this one-period perturbation of the capital stock: the company issues equity or debt in period t and repurchases equity or repays the principal, along with interest, in period t + 1. The value of the firm is derived from a standard capital market equilibrium condition, according to which a representative shareholder (a domestic resident) will hold equity shares only up to the point where their net return is equal to the net return from selling the company and investing the assets in the best alternative investment available (Treasury bonds, for example). If the value of the firm does not change as a consequence of this one-period perturbation of the capital stock, the pre-tax return of the investment undertaken in period t is equal to the cost of capital and the investment is marginal. If, on the contrary, the one-period change in capital stock increases the value of the company, then the investment project is earning economic rents…. (Giannini, Maggiulli, 2002)

33 33 … sulla relazione fra t, METR e AETR In a world of increased international capital mobility, we highlight how the corporate tax system can affect 1.where firms choose to locate their investment, 2.how much they invest, and 3.where they choose to locate their profits. The average tax rate in different countries might influence the first decision, the marginal tax rate the second, and the statutory tax rate the third (Auerbach et al, 2008 ES).

34 34

35 35 Figure 1.10 shows that, given a fixed inflation rate of 3.5 per cent, the unweighted average of the average effective tax rates has remained fairly stable until 1986 and between 1993 and The unweighted average dropped substantially between 1987 and 1993 and between 1997 and It has declined very little since then. A larger and more pronounced reduction in the unweighted average of the average effective tax rates can again be observed if the actual inflation rates in each country and year are used….. (OECD 2007)

36 36 The differences between these two series are smaller in the case of average effective tax rates than in the case of marginal effective tax rates (Figure 1.8), since the average effective tax rates depend rather more on the statutory corporate tax rate and rather less on tax allowances. Nevertheless, the two approaches give a similar qualitative picture of the development of the corporate effective tax rates. This result therefore confirms that the reductions in the statutory corporate tax rates have had a stronger impact than the base broadening measures that have been undertaken. (OECD 2007)

37 Indicatori macroeconomici

38 38

39 39 The ratio increased for the small-sized OECD countries from 2.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent and for the medium-sized OECD countries from 2.2 per cent in 1982 to 3.8 per cent in 2004…. … The corporate tax to GDP ratio has decreased for the large-sized OECD countries from 3 per cent in 1982 to 2.7 per cent in This downward trend is primarily caused by the decrease in the corporate tax to GDP ratio in Japan; it decreased from 5.2 per cent in 1982 to 3.8 per cent in The ratio has remained relatively constant over time for the other large-sized OECD countries. (OECD, 2007)

40 40

41 41 Lower tax burdens but no decrease in corporate tax revenues Despite the strong reduction in statutory corporate tax rates, corporate tax revenues have kept pace with – or even exceeded – the growth in GDP, and the growth in revenues from other taxes in many OECD countries. The fact that small-sized and medium-sized OECD countries now raise more revenue from taxing corporate income and that large-sized OECD countries, except for Japan, do not raise less revenue seems to be inconsistent with the strong reductions in statutory corporate tax rates and marginal and average effective tax rates. Indeed, this is a puzzle which requires further research and explanation. A number of arguments might however offer an explanation…… (sempre da OECD, 2007)

42 42 1. First, the strong reductions in statutory corporate tax rates have been partly offset by the expansion of the corporate tax base through the implementation of less generous tax depreciation allowances and through the elimination of special tax deductions and provisions. Less generous tax depreciation allowances have broadened the corporate tax base especially during the second half of the 1980s, as shown in Figure 1.6.

43 43 2. Second, changes in corporate profitability may explain the increased corporate tax revenues as more profitable corporations pay more corporate taxes. This might not only be part of a cyclical movement but might also be the result of fundamental changes in profitability. Becker and Fuest (2007) for instance demonstrate for Germany that globalisation has increased pre-tax profitability in the economy, thus leading to higher corporate tax revenues. Moreover, the reduction in the corporate tax rate may have increased the total amount of investment that is undertaken by the corporate sector, which then might have increased the corporate tax liabilities and corporate tax revenues as well.

44 44 3. The increase in corporate tax revenues in low-tax countries may be caused by the inflow of investment and/or mobile corporate profits that are shifted out of high-tax countries in order to avoid corporate taxes. For example, Ireland has had a low 10 per cent tax rate on manufacturing activity since the early 1980s. One consequence has been a strong increase in inward investment – and probably inward flows of profit: this in turn has boosted corporate income tax receipts as a share of GDP and as a share of tax revenues, despite the continuing low tax rate. This argument may partly explain why corporate tax revenues in small-sized OECD countries have increased more than in large- sized OECD countries.

45 45 4. Another argument that might offer an explanation is that lower corporate tax rates have increased the incentive to incorporate and to shift income from the non-corporate into existing corporations, thereby increasing the relative size of the corporate sector. Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002) have studied the share of corporate savings in total private savings for OECD member countries. They show that higher capital income tax rates at the personal level may increase the fraction of saving performed within corporations. Lower corporate tax rates may then shift significant amounts of savings from the household sector to the corporate sector. De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) analysed income shifting via incorporation using a panel of European data. They found that the increasing gap between personal income and corporate income taxes has a significant positive effect on the incorporation of new and existing firms. The revenue effects of lower corporate tax rates will then partly show up in lower personal income tax revenues rather than lower corporate income tax revenues.

46 46 5. In addition, Sorensen (2007) notes that the growing importance of the corporate sector might also be explained by the decline of certain sectors such as agriculture where the non-corporate organisational form was dominant. Auerbach (2006) suggests that the rising share of the financial sector in the economy might have partly caused the increase in corporate tax revenues as well.Sorensen (2007)

47 47 Sorensen, 2007, scompone il rapporto fra il gettito dellimposta societaria (R)e il Pil (Y), nel seguente modo: Here R is total corporate tax revenue, Y is GDP, C is the total profit earned in the corporate sector, and P is the total profit earned in the economy as a whole. The fraction R/C may be seen as a rough indicator of the average effective corporate tax rate, since it measures total corporate taxes paid relative to the total pre-tax earnings of the corporate sector.9 Thus the decomposition suggested above will show whether an increase in the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP is due to an increase in the effective tax burden on the corporate sector, R/C; whether it reflects an increase in the share of total profits accruing to the corporate sector, C/P; or whether it is due to an increase in the profit share of total GDP, P/Y….

48 48 Osservando i dati conclude: …Thus part of the reason why governments have managed to stabilize or even increase the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP is that the corporate sector has expanded at the expense of non- corporate firms. In part this may reflect the secular decline of certain sectors such as agriculture where the non- corporate organizational form has tended to dominate, but it may also reflect income-shifting into the corporate sector induced by the large drops in statutory corporate tax rates. In both cases the gain in corporate tax revenue will tend to be offset by a loss of revenue from the personal income tax. However, none of the countries have experienced a significant drop in their aggregate effective corporate tax rate (R/C), and in several countries such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Italy, the effective corporate tax rate even seems to have increased. In other words, it appears that governments have made up for the drop in statutory tax rates by broadening the corporate tax base, e.g. by eliminating special deductions and moving towards less generous rules for asset depreciation, etc. in line with the taxcut-cum-base-broadening philosophy that became popular in the 1980s and early 1990s.. (Sorensen, 2007).

49 49 6. Moreover, the reduction in statutory and effective corporate tax rates reduces the benefits of (excessive) corporate tax-planning. Lower corporate tax rates reduce for instance the benefits of profit-shifting through transfer pricing and thin capitalisation (see also Haufler and Schjelderup [2000]). This might also have reduced the corresponding corporate tax compliance costs, which are deductible from the corporate tax base. The reduced corporate tax-planning efforts might therefore have increased the taxable corporate tax base, which may have partly offset the tax revenue loss due to the lower statutory and effective corporate tax rates. (OECD, 2007)

50 50 7. Finally, the fact that corporate tax revenues did not decline may partly be caused by stricter corporate tax enforcement policies enacted by OECD countries. Indeed, OECD countries have increased their efforts to reduce the shifting of profits between jurisdictions. Some countries may also have intensified their tax audits in order to reduce corporate tax-avoidance and evasion behaviour.

51 51 Altri commenti su andamento indicatori Trends in tax rates. Statutory corporate income tax rates have fallen substantially in most OECD countries over the last decades. This would seem to support the hypothesis that growing capital mobility and the ensuing international tax competition puts downward pressure on source-based capital income taxes. However, statutory corporate tax rates remain far above zero, and corporate tax bases in almost all OECD countries have also expanded, through reductions in the generosity of allowances. Thus the effective corporate tax rates have fallen, but by much less than the statutory tax rates (see, inter alia, Chennells and Griffith (1997), Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002), Griffith and Klemm (2004) and Devereux and Sørensen (2006)). This finding is based on an analysis offorward-looking measures which use the methodology developed by Auerbach (1983) and King and Fullerton (1984) on the basis of Jorgensons (1963) user cost of capital. …..

52 52 Altri commenti su andamento indicatori ……………….. The backward-looking measures do not show any systematic tendency for the overall effective tax rate on capital income to fall (see Carey and Rabesona, 2004). This is consistent with the fact documented in Devereux and Sørensen (2006) that corporate tax revenues have remained fairly stable and have even increased as a percentage of GDP in several OECD countries. How can the buoyancy of corporate tax revenues be reconciled with the tendency for average effective corporate tax rates to fall? Using data from OECD national income accounts, Sørensen (2007) finds that, while the total profit share has remained fairly stable, the share of total profits accruing to the corporate sector has in fact tended to increase significantly in several countries during the last two decades. The evidence presented by de Mooij and Nicodème (2006) suggests that part of the increase in the corporate share of total profits reflects tax- induced income-shifting from the non-corporate to the corporate sector. ……

53 53 Altri commenti su andamento indicatori … To sum up, there is evidence that the location of real investment, the cross-country pattern of company ownership and in particular the location of paper profits react to international tax differentials. There is also evidence that national tax policies are inter-dependent, although the extent to which this reflects competition for mobile tax bases is unclear. Further, statutory corporate tax rates have fallen significantly in recent decades and forward-looking measures of effective tax rates have also tended to fall, but corporate tax revenues have been stable or even increased. Thus source-based capital income taxes seem alive and well (Griffith, Hines, Sorensen, 2008) Sarà così anche in futuro? La concorrenza fiscale non è un problema? Non è necessaria alcuna forma di cooperazione?

54 54 Testi di riferimento Vedi programma Altre letture citate Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith (1998), The Taxation of Discrete Investment Choices The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper series No.W98/16, London. EEC (2001), Company Taxation in the Internal market, SEC(2001)1681, Brussels. OECD (2001), Effective Tax Burdens: Alternative Measures, Paris. OECD, Fundamental reform of corporate income tax, OECD Tax policy studies, n.16, 2007, ch. 1 Giannini S., Maggiulli C., Effective Tax Rates in the EU Commission Study on Company Taxation: Methodological Aspects, Main Results and Policy Implications, Cesifo Economic Studies, 2002


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